The surge in irregular migration from eastern Libya to Crete demands an uncomfortable reckoning with European complicity. This year, almost 20,000 people have already attempted the perilous crossing, with 710 people arriving in 14 boats on October 20 alone, followed by hundreds more the next day. The route from areas around Tobruk, Libya's eastern Mediterranean port, has become increasingly significant precisely because it fills a vacuum created by crackdowns elsewhere—after eastern Libyan armed forces acted against people smugglers heading for Italy in 2023, the networks simply pivoted to smaller boats sailing toward Crete instead. This adaptation reveals a troubling reality: the EU's fragmented approach to migration control is not eliminating smuggling; it is merely reshaping it.

What makes this situation particularly toxic is how it enriches the very actors the EU relies upon. Libya's division since 2014—with a UN-backed administration in Tripoli and Khalifa Haftar's leadership based in Tobruk—has created a 'conflict economy' where armed actors gain political leverage by controlling smuggling routes alongside weapons, goods, and drugs trafficking. The migrants themselves pay as much as $4,000 for the crossing, with the journey taking around a day and a half. According to researchers at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, other criminal groups have now entered the people smuggling business, including those previously focused on moving goods, vehicles, or drugs. The infrastructure for exploitation is already built; it simply gets repurposed.

The EU's cooperation with these Libyan actors represents a devil's bargain that strengthens the very forces driving migration. Andreas Dittmann, a retired professor from Giessen University, captured the contradiction bluntly: such cooperation can control irregular migration but it 'adds to the Libyans' local power.' When those in charge in eastern Libya can influence the scale and timing of migrant movements, they demonstrate strategic importance to European governments—cementing their authority domestically. This dynamic was evident when the Tobruk government signed a maritime agreement with Turkey in late October, a geopolitical maneuver that underscores how migration has become entangled with regional power struggles.

The human cost of this system is staggering. According to an International Organization for Migration report based on May and June data, around 950,000 migrants and refugees were registered as living in Libya, with many lacking access to healthcare or legal residence and work permits. Their vulnerability feeds the informal markets and exploitation that define the conflict economy. Europe's strategy of outsourcing migration control to unstable actors without political legitimacy has backfired spectacularly. Rather than reducing irregular crossings, it has incentivized local power brokers to profit from migration while maintaining just enough control to appear indispensable to Brussels.

A genuine solution requires Europe to abandon the fiction that Libya's fragmented leadership can or should bear responsibility for its migration crisis. Instead of reinforcing armed actors through cooperation agreements, the EU must pursue regional development and safe legal pathways that remove the profit motive from smuggling altogether. The current approach treats symptoms while enriching the disease.